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A Theory of Religion 
What is a religion?  As Socrates might have asked: 
What feature do all and only religions share in virtue
of which they are religions?  This question may seem
misguided. Confronted with the diversity of behaviour
called "religious," we may easily  doubt the existence
of a single feature that explains the religiousity of
every religion. To use Wittgenstein's term, there may
only be a "family resemblance" between religions, a
network of features generally shared, most of which
belong to each religion, no one of which belongs to
every religion. Efforts to produce the single defining
feature tend to strengthen the doubt that one exists. 
Is a religion an attempt to approach God or
appropriate the sacred?  Then Theravada Buddhism is
not a religion, for God and the sacred are
irrelevancies in this tradition.  Is a religion a
practice that expresses and advances the ultimate
concern of a large number of people?  Then the
stockmarket is a religion and so is the drug trade.
Such accounts are typically too narrow or too general,
unless they are circular.  Perhaps religion has no
essence.
In what follows, I will define the single feature
that makes all religions religions; that is, I will
formulate a theory of religion.  My thesis is that
religion, for all its apparent diversity, constitutes
2a unique kind of human behaviour with its own
underlying nature- which this theory reveals. My
motto: Where legislation was, let research be. The
Wittgensteinian, faced with a borderline case
(e.g.,secular humanism or Confucianism), can simply
stipulate whether or not it is a religion. Where there
can be no standard, there is no possibility of getting
things wrong. On my account there is always a fact of
the matter, and the theory provides a criterion which
guides our investigation toward that fact. Science
often begins when we first know what we are talking
about: discovering the nature of the thing we study is
a boon to systematic research. In short, this theory
is meant to be part of science and to help establish
the study of religion as a special science.
                                
                                I
The feature of religions that provides the basis
for the theory I will present is this:  a religion can
be practiced.  Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism
each involve a set of activities that, when done in
the right way for the right reasons, constitute the
practice of that religion.  This suggests that for
every religion, there is a system of practices that
comprises the religion.  A religion is a kind of
system of practices. But plainly this is insufficient.
3Medicine is a system of activities performed regularly
by doctors, but medicine is not a religion.
What differentiates practices that constitute a
religion from practices that do not?  What makes a
system of practices religious?  Part of the answer is
the way the system of practices is rationalized. A
religion must be rationalized by beliefs that
articulate an account of the universe (or an account
of the reality that underlies the universe) according
to which there is the possibility of fit.  That is,
the beliefs that rationalize the system of practices
entail that there is a relation in which a person can
but needn't stand to the rest of what is, which is
fundamentally appropriate to the way things are (or to
the way the reality that underlies the universe is),
such that standing in this relation is, in and of
itself, the greatest human good.  That relation is
fit: with some misgiving I offer harmony as a guiding
metaphor.  So, "fit" denotes any relation satisfying
three conditions:  1) a human creature is one term and
the universe (or the reality that underlies the
universe) is the other, 2) the relation can obtain but
it needn't, and 3) standing in this relation to the
universe is, in and of itself, the greatest human
good.   For convenience, we may call a collection of
beliefs that states an account of fit a religious
4world view.
I maintain that a system of practices is a
religion only when it is rationalized by a collection
of beliefs that entails the possibility of fit.  But
this account is still incomplete, for it fails to
specify the way in which the set of beliefs
rationalizes the practices.  What is the relation
between practices and fit which makes performance
rational according to the religious world view?  I
submit that the relation between practice and fit
cannot be merely productive if the system of practices
is to be a religion:  the whole purpose of performing
the practices cannot be to produce fit in the way that
labor added to leather makes shoes, or dieting results
in weight loss.  If the practices are chiefly a method
or technique for producing fit, they are not a
religion.  Rather, a system of practices is a religion
only when it is rationalized by beliefs according to
which the performance of these practices (because one
accepts the beliefs) is part of what constitutes fit: 
to perform the practices because one accepts the world
view is to assume significantly the appropriate
relationship to what is real.
An analogy may clarify the relationship between
religious practice and fit I have in mind.  Suppose
that friendship is a symmetrical relation, so that I
5am someone's friend only if she is friends with me. 
Visiting my sick friend in the hospital to cheer her
up isn't merely a technique for producing deeper
friendship (though it certainly may produce a deeper
friendship), but part of what it is to be her friend. 
To behave in this way for this reason toward someone
who likes me is to assume significantly the
relationship of friendship to this person:  it is part
of what constitutes being a friend.  (Contrast a
"friendship pill" which I slip into her tea.)  Note
that I might stand in the relation of friendship and
never visit my friend when she is sick, because she is
never sick or because of my phobia for hospitals. 
This behaviour isn't essential to friendship. 
Further, friendship is something more than this
particular behaviour; the behaviour is only part of
what constitutes friendship.  Nor is friendship
reducible to the set of behaviours I do from affection
for my friend. I could do them all and fail to stand
in the relation of friendship if she doesn't
reciprocate; and even the same reciprocal behaviour is
compatible with different degrees of friendship, which
depend in part on depth of affection- often a matter
of luck, natural proclivity, or grace.
Similarly, the taking of the Mass may produce a
deeper relationship with God, but it would be a
6mistake to call the Mass a method or technique for
getting closer to God.  For to participate in the Mass
(for the right reasons) is already to stand
significantly in the appropriate relation to God.  At
the same time, the taking of the Mass may not be
essential for fit:  we might allow that a man on a
desert island who finds a copy of the Gospels might be
saved simply by his love of Christ.  Fit is something
more than the taking of the Mass.  Nor is fit
reducible to the whole set of behaviours we do because
we accept a Christian religious world view, for there
may be degrees of fit that are attainable only by
God's grace.  The force of the claim that a practice
is part of what constitutes fit is that to perform the
practice is to enter significantly into the
appropriate relation.  One can enter into a relation
significantly but not completely; like friendship, fit
can be a matter of degree.  Hence the performance of a
practice that constitutes fit need not ensure that one
has completely attained the relation which is the
highest good.  What matters is that in performing the
practice one ipso facto participates in the relation
that is the summum bonum: the practice is not merely
instrumental to the attainment of fit.
The theory of religion, then, is this:  A religion
is a system of practices that is rationalized by
7beliefs according to which the performance of the
practices constitutes fit. The practices may be
celebratory or commemorative, they may be productive
of good harvests, eternal life, even deeper degrees of
fit;  but if they are a religion, they must also
constitute fit according to the religious world view. 
The word "religion" is derived from the Latin
"religare" which means "to bind together": a religion
binds together the believer and that which is most
real, through practices the very performance of which
is to assume the relation that is taken to be the
chief human good. This is the feature that all and
only religions share which makes them religions.       
     This theory explains why religion is nearly as
ubiquitous as human culture and why religion is
attractive even to those who are not afraid of death
or particularly hungry for security.  People generally
want to know the point of their existence and where
they stand in the scheme of things.  The capacity for
metaphysical yearning is perhaps the most human
attribute of our species.  A religion explicates a
metaphysical connection that (it maintains) is the
main point of human existence, and it enables the
believer to enter into that relation through the
performance of constitutive practice.  Certainly a
religion is a response to all sorts of human and
8social needs, but if a religion doesn't do this much,
it isn't a religion.  Our theory, therefore, explains
why so many people care to be religious.
 
                                II
The theory helps generate a useful taxonomy of
practices and theories closely related to but
substantially different from religions. Some examples: 
l. A system of practices is a religion only when the
performance of the practices constitutes fit. This
feature of the theory enables us to make clearly an
important and intuitive distinction. A system of
exercises rationalized by beliefs according to which
the exercises are merely productive of fit (in much
the way that dieting and exercise produce but do not
constitute weight loss) is a spiritual path, not a
religion.1  A program of austerity, breath control,
mental exercises, and physical postures that are
merely instrumental to the attainment of "moksha" (or
liberation) is an example of a spiritual path.  Here
the practices are primarily a spiritual methodology: 
Vivekenanda entitled a book Yoga: The Science of God
Realization.  Breathing exercises in no way constitute
God realization; they are merely a technique for
producing fit.  By contrast, the reading of the Torah
on the Sabbath isn't a method or a technique for
9producing the appropriate relation to God.  Performing
this practice is to participate in the right
relationship; the practice is part of what constitutes
holiness in Judaism.2  Judaism and Yoga are both
rationalized by religious world views, but Judaism is
a religion and Yoga is a spiritual path. 
2.  A theory of the good is an account of what
constitutes the greatest good for human beings.  As I
mean it, "the greatest human good" needn't be the only
intrinsic good. Rather, the summum bonum is the
intrinsic good such that any life which attains it is
well worth living and any life without it is seriously
defective. In addition, the greatest good is often
viewed as the ground in which other intrinsic goods
are meaningful and truly satisfying. Every religious
world view includes a theory of the good:  the summum
bonum is identified with fit.  But the converse
doesn't hold.  Indeed, there are theories of the good
that are logically incompatible with every  religion. 
For instance, Hedonism, which identifies the sole
intrinsic human good with pleasure, excludes every
religious world view.  Pleasure is a state of an
organism, not a relation that obtains between an
organism and that which is most real (contrast
holiness).  Consequently, if pleasure is the summum
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bonum, no relation between a human creature and the
universe is, in and of itself, the supreme good; hence
all religious world views are false and all religions
misguided.
Of course, pleasure can be a by-product of fit, as
it is of virtue.  Holiness, for instance, can be
pleasant.  But all religious traditions that identify
holiness with fit agree that holiness is
incommensurably more valuable than any quantity of
pleasure which accompanies it. Indeed, an extreme
degree of holiness can be quite unpleasant, a torment
verging on madness- recall what Jesus and Ramakrishna
went through- but a Christian or a Hindu who allows
that there have been more pleasant lives would still
judge the unpleasant holy life as having
incommensurably greater intrinsic worth. Fit is
valuable because it is the fundamentally appropriate
relation between a human being and the rest of the
universe (or the reality that underlies the universe),
not because it is pleasant; and though religious
traditions often tout the pleasure of fit, the nature
of fit is that it would not be rational to shift to
bowling if that turned out to be more enjoyable.  An
analogy to altruism may be helpful: Holiness, like
altruism, requires that we act for the sake of
something other than our own enjoyment; and the
11
devotion to something other than our own enjoyment is
part of what is pleasant in both cases.
3. A philosophy of life, roughly, tells us what
matters in human life and how to get it.  A philosophy
of life is essentially practical: it tells us what to
do to get what matters.  By contrast, a theory of the
good can leave us largely in the dark about how to
live. The theory that the pleasant life is the best
life does not yet tell us what to do to have a
pleasant life.  We can say, tentatively, that a
philosophy of life is a theory of the good conjoined
with practical recommendations for attaining that
good.3 Hedonism conjoined with Epicurus'counsel that
the most pleasant life is devoted to study and
contemplation is a philosophy of life.  But note too
that it is counter-intuitive to cast religions and
spiritual paths as philosophies of life.  The view
that what matters most is to participate in the life
of the risen Christ by taking the mass, saying the
rosary, and so on, or the view that the supreme good
is God realization, which is accomplished by a program
of mantra chanting, breath control, and fasting, both
seem inappropriate candidates for philosophies of
life.  Here we think of philosophy as an alternative
to religion.  We can best capture these intuitions as
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follows:  A philosophy of life is a non-religious
theory of the good4 conjoined with practical
instructions for attaining that good. Secular humanism
is a philosophy of life.
4. The word "cult" is sometimes defined so widely that
all religions are cults- especially the religions of
other people.5 Our theory enables us to formulate a
narrower definition which marks an important
distinction. Cults are ritual practices intended to
please a supernatural or quasi-supernatural being (or
collection of such beings) too limited in its
attributes to ground an account of fit. We ought to
resist the assumption that any ritual practice
intended to please supernatural or quasi-supernatural
elements is sufficient to constitute a religion.
Rituals meant to propitiate elves and fairies are not
a religion. A practice directed at supernatural beings
too minor to ground an account of fit is not by itself
a religious practice.
 Suppose we believe there is a spirit in a local
tree who will protect us from smallpox if we perform
rituals that please him, and this is the entirety of
our belief. Our practices are wholly instrumental: we
would apply electric shocks if that worked better. We
do not mention him at weddings or funerals nor does he
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influence our moral code. Then these practices do not
by themselves constitute a religion.  A religion
cannot be wholly a matter of commerce with the gods.
This is reminiscent of the Melanesian cargo cults, in
which harbors and runways were built and rites
performed to entice passing ships and planes to give
up their cargo. Consider too ritual practices directed
at animal kinds to ensure good hunting. 
Cults can develop into religions, however.  This
happens in one of two ways:  First, the cult object
becomes sufficiently inflated with attributes to
provide the basis for a religious world view,
according to which our practices constitute fit. 
Second, various cults practiced by the same community
intermesh and become a religion.6  The "breakpoint"
between cult practice and religion may come when the
collection of cult practices, taken collectively, is
taken to constitute fit with the gods, taken
collectively.  The summum bonum is to stand in the
relation to The Divine Realm, as manifested by the
gods, which is constituted by ritual devotion to the
particular gods.7 The old cult object becomes a
representative of The Divine. Or the breakpoint may
come when various cult objects come to be viewed as
aspects of one God; for example, in the Bhagavad Gita,
Krishna proclaims that all sincere worship, even of
14
rivers and trees, is directed to Him.  
Of course, there may be no particular moment in
the development of a culture when cults become
religions or parts of religions.  Nonetheless, if
there is to be a religion, the old cult practices must
be reinterpreted so that our definition is satisfied,
at least by an authoritative subset of the population-
rabbis, rishis, or priests. This division of labor in
a community- so that ordinary practitioners allow that
the experts define what the practices are really
about- enables us to count people as practitioners of
a religion who would merely be practicing a cult if
they were practicing alone.8
The conjunction of the theory of religion with
this taxonomy of related practices yields a powerful
and plausible instrument for sorting out previously
intractable problems of classification: see the
Appendix for a demonstration.                      
    
                               
                              III
What about counter-examples? John Calvin taught
that God has predestined some of us to salvation; the
rest of us are damned no matter what we do.  Now fit,
by definition, is a relation that can but needn't
obtain between a human creature and that which is most
15
real. But if salvation is predestined, then nothing I
do can make any difference. The saved cannot be damned
nor the damned saved. It follows that salvation in
Calvinism is not fit.  Still more serious, if nothing
I do can make any difference to whether or not I am
saved, then, even if salvation is fit, nothing I do
can constitute fit.  A consequence of our theory,
therefore, is that Calvinism is not a religion.  But
surely this is false.
This is a fallacious argument, however.  The
doctrine of predestination does not entail that
salvation is a relation that must obtain between God
and those who are saved. For God could have chosen
differently: He could have predestined the saved to be
damned, and vice versa.  So, if am saved, I needn't
have been.  Further, Calvin maintained that the
faithful communicant receives with the elements the
virtue or power of the Body and Blood of Christ
(though Calvin denied that the bread and wine are
changed by consecration).9  Calvin accepts the
Catholic account of the effects of communion; he only
rejects the metaphysics. The sacraments constitute fit
in Calvinism- but only for the elect (for whom they
are redundant); and a symptom of election is that we
will take the sacraments. One often finds constitutive
practices in Protestantism despite the tension with
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Protestant theology- perhaps because they satisfy a
central religious need.10  Calvinism is a religion on
our account, and the counter-example evaporates.
Evangelical Christians believe that we are saved
only through faith in the shed blood of Christ.
Righteous works and religious rituals are useless.
Each believer is reconciled to God forever as a one-
time event at the moment of coming to faith.11 Further,
many Christians maintain that even faith is itself a
gift of God, not a work of man. Paul writes "For by
grace are ye saved through faith, and that not by
yourselves; it is the gift of God, not of works, lest
any man should boast."12 Then how can anything we do
constitute fit? Nonetheless, most Evangelicals agree
that for some the gift is insufficient.  Free-will
plays a role: the gift has to be accepted-  we must
allow ourselves to trust in the sufficiency of the
crucifixion and the resurrection.  Hence an action is
required. This is not a "work" in the sense that is
objectionable to Protestants; we hardly earn salvation
by accepting it. To perform this action is to enter
into salvation, so it constitutes fit. Evangelical
Christianity is a limiting case of a religion: the
system of practices the performance of which
constitutes fit contains a single action performed
just once by each Christian.
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      So far the objections claim the theory is too
narrow. What of the objection that the theory is too
broad? Suppose we insist that the truth relation is
fit: the scientist who accepts the true theory stands
in the relation to the universe that is the summum
bonum. Wouldn't the theory compel the implausible
conclusion that science is a religion- just as much as
Islam and Christianity? It would not. A system of
practices is a religion only when it is rationalized
by beliefs according to which performance of the
practices constitutes fit. Implicit here is that the
beliefs rationalize the practices under descriptions
that do not mention fit. The practices are not
described merely as "fit-constituting practices,"
e.g., "holy practices." Otherwise the beliefs are
empty, asserting only that fit-constituting practices
constitute fit. Such beliefs rationalize nothing.
Consequently, a fit-constituting practice is part of a
religion only if the practice can constitute fit under
a description that doesn't mention fit.
This has an interesting consequence.  Obviously
scientific inquiry does not itself constitute true
belief. If truth is fit, the sole candidate for a
constitutive practice is finding or discovering the
truth-  which only constitutes fit under a description
that mentions truth. If (following Peirce) we try to
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redescribe finding the truth as "arriving at the
belief that all scientific inquirers would sooner or
later accept if they continued inquiring
indefinitely," plainly this needn't be discovering the
truth--unless we abandon the correspondence theory of
truth upon which the identification of truth with fit
depends. Therefore, if truth is fit, the sole
candidate for a constitutive practice is not part of a
religion. So science is not a religion, if truth is
fit.13
I hasten to add that the identification of truth
with fit is implausible prima facie. Why should
accepting the true scientific theory of the universe
be, in and of itself, the greatest human good? The
truth relation seems too intellectual to be the summum
bonum: not enough of the human animal is engaged.
Also, the truth relation obtains primarily between a
representation and the world. Consequently, the
successful scientist's relation to the universe is
mediated by a representation, and it can be analyzed
into her relation to the representation and the
representation's relation to the universe. But fit, I
submit, is immediate and non-composite. By way of
contrast, the direct apprehension of the Good in Plato
and the intellectual love of God in Spinoza are full-
blooded and simple: both are species of fit. Note,
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however, that the practice of Dialectic does not
constitute the direct apprehension of the Good,
anymore than scientific inquiry constitutes
discovering the truth. For Plato and Spinoza, the
study of philosophy is merely productive of fit. Here
philosophy is a spiritual path.
 
                               IV
I have sketched what I believe is a plausible and
useful theory of religion. But the theory is still
incomplete. In this last section I want to complete
it. The best way to see that the theory is unfinished
is to address some technical questions it raises. 
Supposing that S practices a religion, which of S's
practices are part of it?  As it is unlikely that
everything S does is a religious practice, how do we
determine the proper subset of S's practices that is
his religion?  
We might say that S's religion is that set of
practices each of which is such that S would allow its
omission to count against the claim that he practices
his religion.  This strategy has the interesting
consequence that the religiousity of a practice is a
matter of degree, for S may allow some omissions to
count more than others against the claim that he
practices his religion. The trouble is that so-called
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"primitive" people, who generally practice a religion,
often do not have the concept of religion- so the
strategy cannot have universal application.  Nor can
we identify S's religion with the set of practices
each of which constitutes fit according to S's
religious world view.  For plainly not every practice
which belongs to a religion has this function:  a
religion is likely to include some practices that are
merely productive or celebratory and nothing else.
This raises a difficulty for our theory.  For if
religions typically include practices that don't
constitute fit, how can the entire system, including
the practices that don't constitute fit, be
rationalized on the ground that the performance of the
practices constitutes fit?  We may begin to address
the difficulty in this way:  if the performance of
practice a constitutes fit according to the beliefs of
those who perform it, and additional practices x,y,z,
aren't in some way incompatible with fit (e.g.,
sacrilegious), then, trivially, the performance of
a,x,y,z will constitute fit too. So, if just one of
S's practices constitutes fit according to S's
beliefs, then the set of S's practices that are
compatible with fit (which, of course, includes that
one) will be rationalized by S's beliefs- for the
performance of that set will be sufficient to
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constitute fit. In fact, the theory has no problem
including practices that do not constitute fit as part
of a religion; indeed, we can't leave enough out! S's
religion is smaller than the set of practices
rationalized by S's religious world view.  How can we
define that smaller set?
We need to count the fact that a religion isn't
wholly determined by the religious world view that
rationalizes it.  Often practices are part of a
religion on account of relative accidents, for
instance, the tradition that preceded the acceptance
of the religious world view (as Mayan religion is
reflected in Roman Catholic holidays in Mexico, and
shamanism in Tibetan Buddhism). The aesthetic
imagination of a people, their social organization,
and their way of making a living often play a
substantial role in determining religious practice. 
Nonetheless, practices that are part of a religion
will usually relate in some important way to the
religious world view and especially to the conception
of fit it entails.  We have seen that practices can be
constitutive of fit and productive of fit.  Further,
practices can be celebratory of fit (Simchat Torah),
commemorative of fit (celebrating the Buddha's
birthday), symbolic of fit (the Chanukah menorah,
which symbolizes the covenant- God's promise not to
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allow the Jewish people to be destroyed). Let us say
that a practice related to fit in any of the above
ways is "significantly tied to fit." We might say that
a religion is a system of practices rationalized by
beliefs according to which the performance of the
system constitutes fit, wherein each practice is
significantly tied to fit. A consequence is that
practices which are merely productive of fit can
nonetheless be part of a religion, though they cannot
constitute a religion by themselves: a religion can
contain a spiritual path.
However there may be practices that are part of a
religion which do not stand immediately in any of
these relations to fit. We can at least conceive of
practices none of which taken alone is significantly
tied to fit but which, performed together, conjointly
constitute fit according to a religious world view.14  
Further, particular ethical practices, for example,
turning the other cheek or refraining from killing
animals, may be part of a religion without being
significantly tied to fit. Nonetheless, these
particular practices, when performed against the
background of other practices, are part of what
constitutes fit according to the religious world view. 
Let us say that a practice p is immediately
related to fit when the practice is significantly tied
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to fit in one of the ways mentioned above. So the
taking of the Mass is immediately related to fit
because the performance of this practice is
constitutive of fit according to Roman Catholicism;
and celebrating the Buddha's birthday is immediately
related to fit because this performance is celebratory
of fit (see the Appendix for a Buddhist account of fit
and constitutive practice).
A practice p is mediately related to fit when it
is not immediately related to fit and
(a) p is part of a collection of practices (no one of
which constitutes fit) that conjointly constitute fit
and the collection would not constitute fit without p
(or would constitute fit to a lesser degree without
p), according to the religious world view,
or
(b) the addition of p to the set of practices that are
immediately related to fit produces a set of practices
which collectively constitute fit to a greater degree
than the original set, according to the religious
world view. So if I take the Mass and turn the other
cheek I am holier than if I just take the Mass. 
Now we can say that a religion is a system of
practices rationalized by beliefs according to which
the performance of the system constitutes fit, where
each practice in the system is either immediately or
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mediately related to fit. The set of practices
immediately related to fit is typically surrounded by
a halo of mediate practices. This again suggests that
some religious practices are more religious than
others. In a religion containing immediate practices
that constitute fit, practitioners usually take the
omission of these immediate practices to count more
against the claim that someone practices the religion
than the omission of non-constitutive immediate
practices. The failure to meditate counts more against
the claim that someone is a practicing Buddhist than
the failure to celebrate the Buddha's birthday.
Further, the omission of practices that constitute fit
usually counts more against the claim that someone
practices the religion than the omission of mediate
practices. The omission of the Mass counts more
against the claim that a woman is a practicing
Catholic than her failure to be a good Samaritan-
though the good Samaritan who takes the Mass is more
of a practicing Catholic than the Catholic who just
takes the Mass. But the Catholic who practices
astrology is no more of a practicing Catholic than the
Catholic who doesn't, for the practice of astrology is
neither mediately nor immediately related to fit in
Roman Catholicism. 
We can now address a final question: As it is
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unlikely that everything S believes is part of his
religious world view, how do we determine which of S's
beliefs belong to it?  A religious world view involves
a particular account of fit, so we might say that S's
religious world view is the smallest set of his
beliefs that states this account. Now surely if a
belief belongs to this set it belongs to S's religious
world view, but does the converse hold? The belief
that there was once a holyman who became enlightened
and was known as "The Buddha" would not be part of S's
religious world view (where S is a Buddhist) because
the smallest set of S's beliefs that states the
Buddhist account of fit doesn't mention the Buddha: it
simply contains what the Buddha taught. Yet this
belief certainly appears to be a part of S's religious
world view, if only because it explains practices that
are part of S's religion (by the criterion given
above), for example, his celebrating the Buddha's
birthday, his meditating before an image of the
Buddha, and so on. These beliefs explain particular
practices, simply in that, if we ask S why he performs
the practice (e.g., why do you sit before that
statue?), S can adequately answer our question by
expressing these beliefs.  
Let us say that S's religious world view  contains
the smallest set of S's beliefs that states the
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particular account of fit to which S subscribes plus
a) beliefs which entail that particular practices are
constitutive of fit (immediately related to fit
because constitutive of it)
b) beliefs which entail that particular practices are
mediately related to fit in one of the two ways
mentioned above 
and
c) beliefs which explain practices that are
immediately related to but not constitutive of fit,
e.g., commemorative practices, celebratory practices,
and so on.
This has the consequence that a shared belief may
be part of S's religious world view and not part of
R's. I have the belief that Jesus said "Turn the other
cheek" but, as I am not a Christian, this belief isn't
part of my religious world view: it plays no part in
rationalizing any of my religious practices. Pope John
Paul also believes that Jesus said "Turn the other
cheek" and, in the context of the Pope's other
beliefs, this entails that the addition of forbearance
to the practices that are immediately related to fit
produces a set which collectively constitutes fit to a
greater degree. So the belief is part of his religious
world view but not mine. Plainly, I can have a belief
that is part of John Paul's religious world view and
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have no religious world view at all. S has a religious
world view only if S has a set of beliefs that states
an account of fit. Failing this none of his beliefs
will constitute a religious world view, even if they
are part of someone else's. 
Let us say that a religious belief is a belief
that is part of a religious world view. Consequently
the same belief may be religious for the Pope and not
religious for the Dalai Lama.  Some beliefs are
religious for any believer, namely, beliefs like "The
summum bonum is to love Krishna," which state an
account of fit. Others, which do not by themselves
entail an account of fit, nonetheless belong to the
smallest set of beliefs that states an account of fit
in a well-known religion, e.g.,"Jesus is the son of
God." The assertion of one of these beliefs warrants a
strong presumption that the believer subscribes to the
other beliefs in that set.  Beliefs of both kinds are
paradigmatically religious-the sort we would naturally
give as examples of religious belief.  Our discussion
suggests that the religiousity of a belief can be a
matter of degree. S's beliefs that are religious for
any believer or which belong to the smallest set of
her beliefs that states an account of fit are likely
to count more for the claim that S is a believer in
her religion than religious beliefs which would not be
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religious for S if she rejected that account of fit. 
To sum up: What is a religion? A religion is a
system of practices rationalized by beliefs according
to which the performance of the system constitutes
fit, wherein each practice is either immediately or
mediately related to fit. The religious world view
that rationalizes a religion is made up of an account
of fit plus beliefs that rationalize or explain the
practices that are mediately or immediately related to
fit. A religious belief is part of a religious world
view. This theory provides a framework in which
difficult questions about religions and related
phenomena can be intelligibly addressed. My hope is
that it makes up in science and clarity what it lacks
in poetry. Would it have satisfied Socrates? Little
did. Perhaps he might have allowed that the theory, if
not the end of the path, is a step in the right
direction.
            Appendix     
The theory provides a criterion to which we can
appeal in difficult cases to decide whether or not we
are confronted with a religion. Let me demonstrate the
utility  of the theory and the accompanying taxonomy
by using them. "Theravada Buddhism" is often used to
denote early Buddhism, as preserved in the Pali canon.
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The Buddha taught that the gods are useless to
believers. Enlightenment is the result of an ethical,
self-reliant life (the 8-fold path), including
meditative practices which reveal that all phenomena
are transient, unsatisfying, and egoless. This insight
leads to the cessation of desire (or grasping) and,
consequently, to the end of suffering. There is
neither worship nor ritual in early Buddhism; yet the
Buddha founded a monastic order that exists today, and
Buddhism is counted among the world's great religions.
Is Buddhism a religion or something else- perhaps a
philosophy of life?  Scholars differ without knowing
what is really at stake.  Matters are complicated
further by the development of several schools of
Buddhism in its 2,500 year history- in some of which
the Buddha is worshipped as a God-plus vigorous
controversy over the meaning and proper emphasis of
what the Buddha taught. While we cannot completely
settle the matter here, our theory ought to provide a
simple and illuminating way to sort Buddhism out. Does
it?
The Buddha taught the cause of suffering and the
way out of suffering.  The cause of suffering is
desire; the way out is the eradication of desire by
following the 8-fold path. Nibbana, the goal of the 8-
fold path, is negatively described as the permanent
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cessation of desire (likened to a spent candle going
out). On this account, Buddhism is a philosophy of
life: the chief human good is the absence of
suffering, and the practical way to that good is the
8-fold path.  The absence of suffering is not a
relation between the believer and the universe; so the
good, on this account, is not identified with fit.  
 Hindus, however, often insist that the Buddha was
a great Hindu holyman and reformer. Nibbana, they say,
is simply God realization negatively described.  The
Buddha feared that a more positive description would
lead only to intellectualizing; nonetheless the ending
of desire and the resulting loss of the illusion of a
personal self are the sufficient condition for God
realization in the Vedic tradition, in which the
Buddha was immersed.  Indeed, the Pali canon sometimes
refers to Nibbana as "the deathless" and "the
unconditioned"- terms suggestive of God. Those who
think the Buddha rejected Hinduism have mistaken his
practicality and reticence for atheism.  On this
account, Buddhism is a spiritual path:  God
realization is a species of fit and the 8-fold path a
method for producing God realization.
But there is also a  non-theistic account of fit
arguably implicit in Theravada Buddhism, an account
later developed more explicitly in China and Japan. 
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Anyone attached to mind, body, and other transient
things is out of harmony with a natural world of
wholly momentary objects. Suffering is the struggle to
maintain this delusory separation; the sense of self
is the effort of desire and thought to lift body and
mind from the transient stream. To cease grasping
after the transient is to resume one's natural
condition.  This reunion is the fundamentally
appropriate relation between a human creature and the
universe (including his own mind and body) and it is,
in and of itself, the chief human good.
 Along with this conception of fit, the Soto Zen
school of Buddhism identifies enlightenment with the
meditative mind. To attend each moment to the psycho-
physical stream is to flow side by side with the other
empty processes in nature and to resume one's natural
selfless condition.  Meditation produces deeper
degrees of fit; nonetheless, to assume the meditative
stance is already to stand in the right relation to
the universe. Soto teachers claim that this account is
the essence of the Buddha's original teaching. Indeed,
the early Buddhist canon describes the meditating monk
as faring along "not grasping anything in the world."15
If Nibbana is negatively described as the permanent
cessation of grasping, the meditating monk enters
significantly (but not permanently) into the summum
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1. This distinction largely underlies inchoate popular attempts
to contrast religion and "spirituality" or to distinguish
religion in a "narrow and a wide sense."
bonum, which described positively may be reunion with
nature. Consequently, to follow the 8-fold path is to
stand in the relation to the universe which is the
chief human good.  
On this account, Buddhism is a non-theistic
religion:  the 8-fold path is rationalized by beliefs
according to which  its performance constitutes fit. 
Our theory, therefore, has the consequence that
Buddhism (including Theravada Buddhism) is a religion
according to the views of at least one of the schools
of Buddhism.  But the theory also explains why
Buddhism can be viewed as a philosophy of life and,
further, as a spiritual path. Most important, the
theory reveals clear and substantial differences
between these positions. This is not just a difference
in words. It is a matter of some interest and moment
whether and to what extent the scriptures and
traditions support one of these positions over the
others.  A scholarly discussion can now proceed that
was virtually impossible before.         
                           Footnotes
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2. In Judaism, fit is participation in the
manifestation of the Godhead in human history:  it is
constituted by keeping the covenant and the law of God
"who has sanctified us by His commandments."
3. Of course, philosophies of life are often
unsophisticated: also, the theory of the good and the
practical instructions are sometimes contained in one
statement.  The view that what matters most in life is
affectionate relations with one's family involves a
rough-grained theory of the good- affectionate
relations with one's family are what matter most- and
the practical locus of the good is obvious:  to have
the good one ought to spend plenty of time with one's
family, not sacrifice family relations to work, and so
on.  So this single proposition constitutes a
philosophy of life.
4. A non-religious theory of the good is simply any
theory of the good which does not identify the good
with fit. 
5. I owe this witticism to Lyle Downing.
6. The emergence in the community of a shared idea of
holiness or piety can be an indication that this has
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happened. Recall the insistence of Euthryphro, Plato's
fundamentalist polytheist, that holiness is what the
gods all love and unholiness is what the gods all
hate.
7. Consider Euthyphro's suggestive contention that
holiness isn't holy because the god's love it; rather
the gods love holiness because it is holy. Holiness
does not owe its value to the gods. But surely
holiness does owe its value to some extent to the
divinity to which the believer is related. This
suggests that holiness transcends the gods- the terms
of the relation are the believer and The Divine.
 
8. Cults can also arise within religions. A figure
(supernatural or human) may arise against the
background of a pre-existing religious world view, who
is taken to have the power to provide a quick route to
fit for those who worship her. This person is too
limited and local in her features to provide an
account of fit by herself- so she is a cult object.
She is not a mere representative of The Divine (The
Divine in one of its forms); we worship the cult
object, not The Divine, believing that in return she
will use her power to place us in the right relation
to The Divine. Early Christian theology (including the
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selection of "heresies") is motivated by the need to
construe Jesus so that he is neither a cult object
within Judaism on the one hand nor a mere
representative of the Jewish God on the other. 
Otherwise Christianity could not emerge as a separate
religion with its own constitutive practice. More
recently, the Virgin Mary has arisen as a cult object
within Roman Catholicism.
Further, cult practices (for example, the 
practice of propitiating animal kinds to ensure good
hunting) may be part of a whole way of life  that
emphasizes a relation of man to nature which
constitutes fit. What I know of the religion of
American plains Indians suggests that a whole way of
life (of which a cult practice is a significant
expression) can constitute fit: an entire culture can
be a religion. The cult practice significantly
expresses a religious way of life in that the cult,
though it is chiefly productive, provides an
opportunity to apologize to the animal kind for the
necessity of hunting. This courtesy is a mark  
of the fundamentally appropriate relationship to
nature that the whole way of life constitutes. Here
the cult practice neither develops into a religion nor
arises within one; it may always have been part of a
religion. 
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9. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. F.L.Cross,
(Oxford University Press, l961), p. l425.
10. John Kent writes "It is worth remembering that,
while the Eucharist has not been celebrated as often
as the sixteenth-century reformers would have in some
Protestant traditions, the actual service has never
lost the social character of the people of God sharing
in the means of grace." Ibid., p.119.
11. I owe this sentence and much of my description of
Evangelism to Scott Calef, who brought this objection
to my attention.
12. Ephesians ch.2, vs 8-9.
13. Could identical systems of practices be
rationalized by wildly divergent religious beliefs?
Only if the practices are underdescribed. The words
"We believe in the one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only
son of God..." could  mean in another culture "I
hereby adore the Great Pumpkin." But the Catholic
practice is to say these words meaning that we believe
in the one Lord, Jesus Christ. When the priest says of
the wafer "This is the body of Christ," he is
declaring that it is the body of Christ by saying
those words. The recipient, in saying "Amen," is
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affirming her belief that the wafer is the body of
Christ. In reciting the Psalms, Jews are praying to
the God of Moses. Just as the same physical movement
can be described as waving hello or merely stretching,
depending on the agent's intentions, religious
practices are described in terms of the beliefs which
motivate them. We aren't just making sounds and
collapsing in a heap, but praising Allah and bowing to
Mecca. Substantially different beliefs generate
different act- descriptions, hence different
practices.
14. Recall our discussion in footnote seven of the
possibility that an entire culture might constitute
fit.
15. Majjhima-nikaya I, 55-63 in Buddhist Texts Through
the Ages, ed. Edward Conze (Harper and Row, l964),
p.59.
